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This paper analyzes the reasons behind the low rates of contribution to social 
security programs in developing countries. Using a large set of harmonized 
household surveys from Latin America we compare contribution patterns among 
wage employees, for whom participation is compulsory, with contribution 
patterns among self-employed workers, for whom participation is often voluntary. 
In all countries, contribution rates among salaried workers are similarly correlated 
with education, earnings, size of the employer, household characteristics and age.  
In addition, contribution patterns among salaried workers are highly correlated 
with contribution patterns among the self-employed. Our results indicate that on 
average more than 30 percent of the explained within-country variance in 
contributions patterns may be accounted for by individuals’ low willingness to 
participate in old-age pension programs. Nonetheless, we also find evidence 
suggesting that some workers are rationed out of social security against their will.     
 
JEL classification: J32, J81 
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  3  41. Introduction 
 
The low coverage of social security programs in developing countries is often attributed to their 
large rates of informal employment. Implicit in this view is that workers are rationed out of 
social security against their will because they are unable to find good jobs with benefits. In this 
paper we examine the validity of this hypothesis to explain the causes of low participation in 
public old-age pension programs.   
Throughout the world, pension plans have been introduced to insure consumption in old 
age. For salaried workers, participation in these programs is linked to employment, since 
employers are required by law to register workers and pay contributions to pension 
administrators. While the rationale for such policies is that, in the absence of compulsory savings 
many people would not save enough for retirement, many employers have failed to enroll their 
workers in these plans.  
Table 1 presents average contribution rates during the 1990s and the beginning of the 
twenty-first century for different samples of workers in Latin America. These rates are computed 
from individual household surveys (see Section 4 for a description of the data). On average, only 
two out of every five remunerated workers 15 to 64 years old are contributing towards future 
pensions. While some workers might have contributed in former jobs and thus accrued some 
future pension rights, current contributions rates are very low, suggesting that a large share of the 
labor force in Latin America will not receive old-age pensions. Nonetheless, there are large 
differences across countries. Costa Rica, Chile and Brazil show contribution rates above 50 
percent. On the other hand, in Nicaragua, Peru and Paraguay less than 25 percent of workers 15-
64 years old participate in such programs. Even if we consider only salaried workers and exclude 
public sector workers—a group for which compliance with public mandatory programs is 
higher—no more than 25 percent of private sector salaried workers are contributing toward 
future pension benefits in those three countries.  This is a surprisingly low figure, particularly as 
contributing to old-age pension programs is compulsory for these workers. Contribution rates 
among self-employed workers are even lower. With the exception of Costa Rica, which shows 
contribution rates around 40 percent, non-contribution rates among this group are very high, 
  5even in Brazil, where contributions are compulsory.
2 In many countries less than one in ten self-
employed workers are contributing.   
We explore the causes behind such low participation rates in various ways. We first 
present a very simple model of participation in an old age pension program to guide the 
empirical analysis. This model builds a bridge between the savings/insurance literature and the 
labor supply literature and shows that some individuals are more willing than others to 
participate in an old age program. It also discusses cases in which suboptimal contributions and 
rationing may appear.   
We then explore the patterns of contributions among salaried workers and find striking 
commonalities in the determinants of participation across countries despite fundamental 
differences in pension programs (pay-as-you-go versus individual capitalization accounts). In all 
countries studied, contribution rates strongly increase with the education and the age of a 
worker, picking up among workers who have some college education and are of prime working 
age (25-49). Women tend to contribute more than males, while being married and head of the 
household increases an individual’s probability of contributing, particularly for males. 
Individuals in households with a higher share of non-earners are more likely to contribute, while 
the size of the household is negatively correlated with the probability of contribution. Individuals 
working in urban areas at firms with more than five employees, employed full time, and in 
manufacturing are more likely to contribute than other workers. Workers in households where 
other members are already contributing and workers with higher earnings are also more likely to 
contribute. Our results indicate that demand factors (individual and household variables) may 
account for more than 30 percent of the explained variance, with job related factors also 
accounting for a substantial share.  
The coefficients of demand and job related factors in a Probit or Logit model of social 
security participation might be biased due to omitted variables. This is particularly relevant in 
this context because demand and job-related characteristics are expected to be highly correlated. 
In particular, the danger is that we might be attributing undue importance to demand factors 
because demand coefficients capture the correlation between worker and household 
characteristics and some omitted job characteristics. To disentangle these effects, we compare 
                                                       
2 The Argentinean household survey does not track contributions among self-employed workers even though 
contributions for this group are compulsory.  
  6contribution patterns among wage employees, for whom participation is compulsory, with 
contribution patterns among self-employed workers, for whom participation is often voluntary. 
Since the latter are free to reveal their preferences for social protection, a comparison between 
the two groups can shed light on the causes behind low contribution rates. We find strong 
commonalities between contribution patterns among wage employees and self-employed 
workers. These patterns suggest that, to a large extent, the low contribution rates observed in 
Latin America are driven by a combination of certain types of workers’ low willingness to 
participate in social security programs and the State’s inability to enforce firms’ contributions for 
workers not willing to participate. Yet, quite importantly, our evidence also suggest that some 
groups of workers, such as workers earning wages below the minimum wage, or part-time 
employees, might be rationed out of social security against their will.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of 
old-age pension systems in Latin America, and Section 3 presents a simple model of the 
determinants of contributions to old-age pensions programs. Section 4 discusses the data used in 
this paper, and Section 5 presents the results of studying contribution patterns for wage 
employees and self-employed workers in a large number of countries. Finally, Section 6 
concludes and provides some implications for social protection policies. 
 
2. Profile of Pension Systems and Contribution Rates in Latin America 
 
2.1. Pension Programs in Latin America 
 
Latin American countries present a variety of old-age pension programs. Here we focus on the 
11 countries included in our empirical analysis (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela). Up to the 1970s, all of them 
relied on publicly administered pay-as-you-go systems in which contributions from the active 
population afforded the benefits of inactive pensioners; pensions were defined by governments 
according to a formula based on previous salaries and contributions. Chile was the first country 
to introduce mandatory private individual capitalization accounts in 1981, and it has been the 
model for many other reforms of social security systems around the world (Acuña and Iglesias, 
2001). The origin of the privatization movement was mainly driven by financial problems; the 
public social security systems were highly indebted and facing an aging population, which 
jeopardized sustainability.  
  7Mexico (1997) and El Salvador (1998) adopted systems of individual capitalization 
accounts based on the Chilean model.  Individual accounts are privately managed and supervised 
by a governmental agency.  Pensions depend upon the balance accumulated in the personal 
account and the type of payout chosen after retirement (schedule withdraw, permanent life 
annuity or temporary income with deferred life annuity). In Chile, Mexico and El Salvador, the 
government guarantees a minimum subsidized pension. In Mexico, new entrants have to affiliate 
with the new system, while affiliates with the previous pay-as-you-go system can choose at 
retirement to opt for the new or the old system.  On the other hand, in El Salvador at the time of 
reform, some people affiliated with the old system were forced to remain in the pay-as-you-go 
scheme (older than 55/50 for men/women) while others were free to choose (middle age). New 
entrants are only allowed to participate in the new private system. 
Peru (1993) and Colombia (1994) introduced a parallel private capitalization accounts 
system that competes with the pay-as-you-go system. Workers are free to choose between the 
two modalities. In Colombia, for example, they are able to switch every three years. 
Alternatively, Argentina (1994) and Costa Rica (2000) introduced reforms to combine 
the main characteristics of both systems. The public system is kept as a basic pillar, but it is 
complemented by individual capitalization accounts.   
Finally, Nicaragua and Venezuela have laid the legal foundations for reforms but they 
have not implemented them, while Brazil and Paraguay maintain their public pay-as-you-go 
systems. It should be noted, however, that in Brazil some parametric reforms have been carried 
out in order to homogenize different pensions systems among the different governmental levels. 
A broader discussion about structural reform is currently taking place as well.  
In most cases, the reforms have increased the years of contributions necessary to retire 
and the contribution rates. The goal has been to increase the link between the contributions and 
the benefits obtained from the system and therefore strengthen its financial sustainability  
In all the countries studied, social security contributions are compulsory for wage 
employees and are voluntary for the self-employed (except in Brazil and Argentina, where 
contributions are also compulsory for the self-employed). Table 2 presents a description of the 
Social Security Systems in the eleven Latin American countries under study.  
 
  83. A Simple Model of Participation in Old Age Pension Programs 
 
In this section, we adapt the De la Rica and Lemieux (1993) model of health insurance to model 
the decision to participate in pension programs in Latin America. This simple model is useful in 
that it helps to clearly state some predictions regarding which workers are more likely to 
contribute to social security programs. We first consider the case when participation is voluntary 
and then develop the case when participation in the program is compulsory but enforcement is 
weak.  
 
3.1. Voluntary Participation  
 
Assume a two-period economy where individuals (workers) have the possibility to participate in 
a pension program to insure consumption in the old age. In the first period, individuals work, 
consume, save for the second period, and decide whether to contribute a fraction t of their labor 
income W towards future pensions; in the second period, they retire and consume their first-
period savings and the pension B.  Workers can only participate in the plan through their 
employers, who in turn collect the contributions and transfer the funds to the pension program 
administrator. Participation in this program is voluntary; workers decide whether to participate 
based on whether they are better off receiving the pension and paying tW than otherwise. 
Assume that worker i’s preferences can be represented by:  
U(C1i, C2i) = u(C1i) + 
i ρ + 1
1
  u(C2i) 
where Cji denotes consumption in period j by individual i and  i ρ is the individual i discount rate. 
Assume further that u’(Cji)>0 and u”(Cji)<0.  Given a pension program indexed by (t,  B), 
workers will choose consumption levels that maximize their utility function subject to their inter-
temporal budgetary constraint given by 




 (C2i – B)                                      (1) 












.   That is, consumption in the first period will be higher (lower) than 
  9consumption in the second period if interest rates are lower (higher) than the discount rate.  





Worker i will prefer to participate in the pension benefit program if  
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and condition (2) will hold if and only if 
                      tWi≤
r + 1
1
Β   (3) 
that is, if the present value of the pension is no less than the cost of the contribution. The higher 
the discount rate and the higher the tax relative to the pension, the less likely it is that a worker 
will voluntarily participate in the pension plan. In a pay-as-you-go system, pension benefits are 
given by  B=αWe,  where  α denotes the income replacement value of pensions and e is an 
adjustment factor to account for the fact that workers with a higher life expectancy at the time of 
retirement receive a higher pension The higher the life expectancy, the higher is the total payoff 
awarded by the plan and the more likely it is that a worker is willing to participate. It is therefore 
expected that, in pay-as-you-go systems, women will be more likely to participate in retirement 
plans than men.
3 In addition, since survival probabilities increase with permanent income, 
participation in social security programs will tend to increase with income levels or with factors, 
such as education, that raise permanent income levels for individuals.
4 Instead, in an individual 
capitalization system, the benefit B=(1+r)tW is linked to the contribution and the interest rate, 
and therefore relatively less favorable to individuals with higher life expectancy. Individuals 
whose discount rates are above the interest rates yielded by individual accounts will not 
voluntarily participate.  
Let us now look at the supply side. In order to participate in the program, workers need to 
get jobs. Let ai denote the marginal product of labor of worker i, and let Wri be the reservation 
wage of such worker.  In addition, let si denote the difference between the marginal product and 
the reservation wage for worker i, si = ai - Wri.  Positive surpluses may arise because specific 
skills make a worker more productive in a given firm than in other jobs, or due to rents generated 
                                                       
3 This effect is accentuated by the fact that the legal retirement age tends to be lower for women (see Section 2). 
4 There is ample evidence that income or variables associated to socio-economic status such as education are 
strongly linked to life expectancy. See for example Kitagawa and Hauser (1973), Rogot et al. (1992), and Elo and 
  10by imperfect competition in the labor market. The division of the surplus between employers and  
employees will depend on their relative bargaining power. Let β denote the share of the surplus 
that accrues to workers after bargaining and Wi the wage paid to a worker.  
In this environment, workers will accept jobs as long as Wi   Wr ≥ i, and firms will hire 
workers as long as ai    W ≥ i, while the wage that a worker will receive would be (Wri + 
si*β)/(1+t) for a worker who chooses to participate, and Wri + si*β for a worker who chooses not 
to. This implies that when workers are free to choose whether to contribute or not, firms simply 
collect contributions from workers who have given them instructions to do so. The pension 
program will not affect firms’ labor costs and therefore the existence of such program will not 
change employment decisions by firms.  
 
3.2. Binding Minimum Wages 
 
In the former scenario, all workers who wish to participate in the pension program can do so 
through their employers. This scenario is feasible only when there are no restrictions on wage 
adjustment. Consider for example the case when there is a binding minimum wage, W , such that 
W ≥ Wri+ si*β.
5 Firms hire a worker i as long as ai ≥ W . If  ai ≥  ) 1 ( t + W , the firm can hire the 
worker at the minimum wage, pay the cost of social security and still make a profit. However, 
per-worker profit is higher if no social security contributions are paid.  Instead, if W (1+t) ≥ ai  
≥W  worker i is offered a job only under the condition of no social security contributions. In 
sum, a binding minimum wage may result in inefficiently low pension coverage, since a subset 
of workers may be denied contributions, even when they are willing to pay for them.  
An inefficiently low probability of contributing may also occur if contributions bring 
additional costs for firms (for instance, because it increases the probability of a tax inspection, or 
it requires registering a firm). When minimum wages or other restrictions are important, 
participation is determined by firms and not by workers’ willingness to pay.  
 
3.3. Compulsory Contributions 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Preston (1996). 
5 It may be argued that if enforcement is imperfect minimum wages will not necessarily bind. Yet, recent evidence 
for Brazil and Colombia suggest that despite high levels of non-compliance with social security regulations, 
minimum wages are binding both in the formal and informal sectors. See Maloney and Nuñez (2004) for Colombia, 
and Lemos (2004) for Brazil.  
  11Assume now that participation is compulsory, wages can freely adjust to compensate for 
contributions, and enforcement is weak. As in the voluntary participation case, firms will hire 
workers willing to contribute to the pension program as long as ai   ( Wr ≥ i+si*β).  Instead, 
compulsory participation increases the cost of hiring workers not willing to contribute if the cost 
of non-compliance is larger than zero. Assume that, with probability λ<1, an evading firm is 
discovered and forced to pay the social security contribution plus a fine (t+f) (Wri+ si*β).  Firms 
will choose to abide by the law and affiliate a worker for whom    ai    (Wr ≥ i+ si*β)*(1+t)  if: 
                     ai – (Wri + si*β )(1+t )   a ≥ i – (Wri+ si*β )(1+λ(t+f))                             (4) 
which holds if f  t(1-λ)/λ. ≥
6 Thus, the higher is the probability of being caught and the higher are 
the fines, the more likely are firms to comply. To the extent that λ or f increases with the size of 
the firm, larger firms will be more willing to comply with mandatory programs. Assuming that 
expression (4) holds, then the employment of workers who are not otherwise willing to 
participate may decline. This occurs for workers whose marginal product cannot compensate for 
the tax, that is ai< (Wri+ si*β)*(1+t).
7 In this case contribution rates increase, but at the potential 
cost of lower employment.  
Notice that employment may decline even in the case where condition (4) does not hold 
and firms choose non-compliance. This is because firms still incur the potential costs associated 
with being charged a fine. Thus, the employment condition in this case is:  
ai    (Wr ≥ i+ si*β)* (1+λ(t+f)) 
                                                       
6 Chong and Saavedra (1999) also make the case that entering the informal sector is a decision that both firms and 
employees make on the basis of cost benefit evaluations that are continuously revised and may vary depending on 
changes in institutions, regulations, preferences and changes in economic activity.  
7 If ai<(Wri + si*β )(1+t) but ai > Wri *(1+t) firms could pass on the cost of the contribution to workers without 
necessarily reducing employment, as long as β  declines. 
  123.4. Self-Employment  
 
Workers may become self-employed, either by choice, or because they do not find jobs as wage 
employees. Let us denote the returns to self-employment as Wri.  Workers engaged in self-




Β                           (3)’ 
Enforcement of compulsory contributions in the wage employment sector reduces wage 
employment among workers unwilling to contribute if a i<  (Wri+  si*β)*(1+t).  Enforcement 
results in a higher proportion of contributors among wage employees and a lower share of 
contributions among the self-employed as workers unwilling to contribute shift to self-
employment. 
 
3.5. Summary  
 
The simple model presented above suggests that in economies where enforcement is imperfect 
participation patterns will, to a large extent, reflect individuals’ choices for social protection. Our 
model also shows that better enforcement will result in higher contribution rates among workers 
with low willingness to participate, but at the possible cost of lower wage employment and 
higher self-employment for these workers.  
In this model we have assumed perfectly rational individuals. Nonetheless, pension plans 
are often justified on the grounds of sub-optimal old age savings. The introduction of 
individuals’ myopia or time inconsistency in this simple model would increase workers’ 
disincentives to save and participate in old age pension plans and therefore would reinforce the 
results described above. In other words, (1) weak enforcement may lead to widespread evasion 
among those less willing to participate, and (2) enforcement may increase covered workers’ 
welfare at the cost of lower salaried employment.  
 
4. Data  
 
This study draws from a large set of household surveys from 11 countries during the 1990s. 
Since our methodology involves comparing results within and across countries, we attempted to 
create a set of consistent variables across countries and over time. This implied, for instance, 
  13eliminating some countries for which individual-level information does not clearly identify 
whether the individual is contributing to social security or is instead covered through a family 
member. A related challenge is that, while we focus our attention on old-age pension plan 
participation, for Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela we could 
not isolate contributions to old-age pensions from contributions to other social security benefits, 
such as health care. Consequently, in these countries, the definition includes contributions to 
other social security programs as well.
8  
Another problem is that, while the variable of interest is whether a worker is actively 
contributing to a pension program, in some countries—namely Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and El 
Salvador—the question posed in the household surveys refers to the worker’s affiliation rather 
than contribution status. While affiliation is akin to acquiring an option to accrue rights, the 
option is exercised when an affiliate decides to contribute. In Chile, for example, data from the 
1994 CASEN survey indicates that 93 percent of affiliated salaried workers were contributing at 
the time of the survey.  It is unclear, however, how respondents answer in relation to their 
contribution status when the survey only asks about their affiliation status, since most people do 
not clearly distinguish these two concepts. Moreover, in all countries the questions refer to the 
current job, which increases the probability that the worker interprets the question as current 
contributions. In what follows, we assume that in the four countries mentioned the answers refer 
to contribution rates.  
The data set covers the period 1990-2002; however, the information is not balanced 
across countries. For Argentina, Mexico, Chile and Costa Rica, the data provide good coverage 
of the entire period. For Brazil, the data correspond to the period 1992–1999. For Colombia, the 
data cover the period 1996-1999. For El Salvador, Nicaragua and Venezuela, the information is 
only available for the later half of the period, and for Paraguay, we only have consistent 
information for 1998 and 1999. Lastly, for Peru the available years are 1994, 1997 and 2000. 
The average number of observations per survey and year ranges from 10,900 (Argentina) to 
340,000 (Brazil and Mexico). The geographic coverage of the study is nationwide except in 
Argentina and Mexico, where only urban areas are surveyed. In Argentina, the data are restricted 
to the Greater Buenos Aires area. Table A.1 provides further information on the countries, years, 
geographic coverage and average number of observations contained in the data.  
                                                       
8 See Table B.1 in Appendix B for a more detailed description on the construction of the social security variable.  
  14We restricted the sample to men and women 15-64 years old who work more than 5 
hours per week. We considered two categories of workers: salaried workers and self-employed. 
Salaried workers are individuals who work for a public or private employer in exchange for 
remuneration, either wages or salary. The self-employed operate their own economic enterprise 
or engage independently in a profession or trade, and they hire no employees. We exclude 
employers and non-remunerated workers from the analysis.
9  
In many countries, workers in the public sector enjoy lower retirement ages, more 
generous benefits and/or lower contributions to social security program than workers in the 
private sector. Since we are interested in examining contribution decisions in the context of 
market economies, we exclude public sector workers, whose contributions are made directly by 
the State.  In Chile and Nicaragua, the surveys do not contain information to identify public 
sector workers. We assumed that public sector salaried workers were concentrated in the 
Community, Social and Personal Services Sector (Sector 9, ISIC Revision 2), and we dropped 
this group from the sample. This assumption is based on the fact that in the rest of the countries 
nearly 90 percent of the public sector workers are concentrated in the Community, Social and 
Personal Services Sector. 
A further limitation is that household surveys in Argentina and Venezuela do not provide 
information about social security participation for the self-employed. In addition, contribution 
rates for Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and El Salvador are too low to produce reliable 
estimates. Therefore, we reduce the analysis of self-employment to three countries: Chile, 
Colombia and Costa Rica.
10 
To assess a worker’s wage relative to the minimum wage, we gather minimum wage 
levels from individual country statistical reports and Ministries of Labor. Since wages reported 
in household surveys are net of social security contributions, we use information on total 
workers’ contributions to social security programs (maternity and sickness, pension programs, 
workplace injuries, unemployment insurance and family allowances) obtained from various 
issues of Social Security throughout the World published by the U.S. Social Security 
                                                       
9 While keeping employers and unpaid workers could somewhat increase the size of our sample, we run the risk of 
mixing three groups (unpaid, employers, self-employed) who are too different to be pooled together in the same 
model.  
10 While there are enough self-employed workers contributing in Brazil, we do not provide estimates because 
contributions for the self-employed in Brazil are compulsory 
  15Administration, to compute gross wages.  We also gather information on firms’ contributions to 
such programs to assess whether gross wages fall in the MW-MW*(1+t) interval, where t are 
total contributions to social security paid by firms.  
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the means of the variables included in our analysis of wage 
employees and self-employed workers, respectively. The ratio of contributors among salaried 
workers ranges from 19 percent in Paraguay to 78 percent in Chile.  On average, 50 percent of 
salaried workers are contributing to mandatory old-age pension programs. The share of 
contributors among self-employed workers, on the other hand, ranges from 1 percent in Paraguay 
to 40 percent in Costa Rica.  Women make up 30 percent of the salaried workers and 37 percent 
of the self-employed.  
On average, three out of five salaried workers are in the prime-age group (25-49 years 
old) and have either primary or secondary education.  About 43 percent are heads of households, 
and the share of wage-earners earners in a household also averages 43 percent.  In contrast, 
workers in self-employment tend to be older, less educated and more likely to be heads of the 
household than wage employees.  
The variable firm size distinguishes firms with fewer than five workers from larger firms. 
On average, about 30 percent of employees work for small firms. Sectors of activity are 
identified at the 1-digit, ISIC-Rev. 2 classification. Due to the reduced number of observations 
for some countries in Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing, this sector is merged with 
Mining and Quarrying. Between 20 to 30 percent of the salaried employees are in Manufacturing 
and another 18-25 percent in Wholesale, Retail and Hospitality. Among the self-employed, 
between 23 and 37 percent are concentrated in Wholesale and Retail and Hospitality. 
For salaried workers, non-compliance with minimum wages varies from 3 percent in 
Argentina to 58 percent in Paraguay. Among the self-employed, the incidence of wages below 
the minimum wage tends to be higher than among salaried workers. The incidence of part-time 
work ranges from 4 to 14 percent among salaried workers and is higher among the self-
employed.  
We further identify if the worker lives in an urban area (except in Argentina, Mexico and 
Venezuela, where this variable is not available). In both samples, an average of 70 percent of 
workers reside in urban areas.   
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We estimate the determinants of the probability of contributing to social security using 
individual-level data. For each country, we estimate this probability,  ,   for worker i in sector 
of activity j  (ISIC 1 digit)  in period t,  s=1  denoting  salaried employees and s=2 the self-
employed. We assume that the probability of contribution is explained by the following model: 
ijt
s P













s T S F H Z F P δ δ δ δ δ α + + + + + =        (5) 
where   is a vector of individual characteristics,   is a vector of household characteristics, F i Z i H i 
are a set of variables related to the job, and   and  are a set of sector and time dummies, 
respectively. Finally F(.) represents the c.d.f. of a standard normal variable. Among the personal 
characteristics, we include age, gender, marital status, level of education and geographic area. In 
our simple model, decision-making occurs at the individual level; social security decisions, 
however, are likely to be made at the household level. Consequently, we include controls to 
account for the following factors: whether the individual is the head of the household, if there are 
other members contributing to social security, the total number of household members and the 
share of inactive members by age group (less than 15, 15-64, more than 64). In terms of job 
characteristics, we control for part-time work (that is, if a person works less than 30 hours per 
week), firm size and worker’s wage in relation to the minimum wage. To capture this latter 
effect, we divide the wage distribution in brackets distinguishing whether a worker earns a gross 
wage below the gross minimum wage (MW), between MW and MW(1+t), between MW(1+t) and 
MW(1+t)
j S t T
2, between MW(1+t)
2 and MW(1+t)
3, and above the latter value. The groups of interest 
are workers who earn wages below the minimum wage and workers who earn wages 
immediately above the minimum wage. In the first group, contribution rates are expected to be 
lower because firms cannot register workers at a wage below the statutory minimum. Also, in the 
second-lowest wage group, firms’ contribution to social security cannot be passed on to workers 
in the form of lower wages and therefore the incidence of social security in firms declines.  
Taking the bracket MW(1+t)- MW(1+t)
2 as the reference group, a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient for the income group MW - MW(1+t), accompanied by a non-statistically 
  17significant coefficient for the income group MW(1+t)
2- MW(1+t)
3, would identify a negative 
effect of wage rigidities on social security contributions. We include two thin wage brackets 
immediately above the bracket MW-MW*(1+t)  as control groups in order to distinguish the 
effects of the minimum wage from pure income effects, which would also lead to lower 
contribution rates around the MW.  
We further include a set of time dummies to control for cyclical changes in the interest 
rate and personal income, and a set of sector variables to account for differences in market 
power, importance of specific skills or probability of enforcement that may differ systematically 
across sectors.  
In general, it is not possible to infer whether the observed contribution patterns are driven 
by workers’ decisions or firms’ choices only by estimating expression (5) for salaried workers. 
This is because statistically significant coefficients for the supply variables (firm and job 
characteristics) may reflect sorting decisions by workers rather than rationing decisions by firm, 
since workers not willing to participate may move to firms with better possibilities to evade. 
Similarly, statistically significant coefficients for demand variables (individual and household 
characteristics) may reflect correlation with unobserved supply factors rather than the effect of 
individuals or household choices.  To address this issue, we compare the coefficients estimated 
for salaried workers, for whom participation is compulsory, with the coefficients estimated for a 
separate sample of self-employed workers. To the extent that the coefficients on the demand 
factors look similar across both groups of workers, it is possible to argue that such patterns are 
the result of workers’ decisions rather than the result of correlation with some supply 
unobservables.   
This identification strategy relies on the assumption that the self-employed as a group 
constitute a good counterfactual for salaried workers. In our case, we will interpret this to be the 
case if the estimate parameters for demand factors are similar across self-employed and salaried 
workers. Recent evidence suggests that, at least with respect to their preferences for social 
protection, self-employed and salaried workers are not greatly different. Barr and Packard (2002, 
2003) perform field experiments in Chile and Peru, asking individuals hypothetical questions to 
measure agents’ risk and time preferences through decisions about contributing to a pension 
program.  They find that the self-employed are indistinguishable from salaried workers with 
  18respect to these parameters, and therefore are free to reveal their preferences for social 
protection.  
 




Table 5 shows the Probit estimates for salaried workers. Across all countries, the probability of 
contributing to social security is strongly correlated with education. In general, there is a large 
increase in the probability of contributing if a worker increases his level of education from 
primary complete to secondary incomplete and an even larger increase when a worker completes 
secondary education. After this level, even when generally the probability grows, the differences 
across education groups are much smaller. The fact that this pattern shows across countries 
regardless of the pension model, even after controlling for wage levels, indicates that the 
education effect goes beyond the positive relationship between education and old-age survival 
probability.  
The probability of contributing to social security also differs substantially across age 
groups.  In all countries, contribution probabilities are higher for prime-age (25-49) and older 
workers (50-65) than for workers younger than 25. In Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Mexico and Venezuela prime-age workers are more likely to be contributing than older workers, 
while in the rest of the countries the opposite is true. In Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru, the three 
countries with the lowest contribution rates, the difference between the contribution rates for 
men 50-64 year-old and prime-age men is very large. This suggests that one of the reasons for 
the low contribution rates is that people only start contributing a few years before the retirement 
age.  
The probability of contributing is higher for single women than for single men in most 
countries. We would expect this to be the case in countries with pay-as-you-go systems, but not 
in countries with individual accounts. It is interesting that Chile, the country that first switched 
from pay-as-you-go to individual accounts, does not show such gender differences. For most 
countries, however, the order is reversed for married women in salaried jobs. To the extent that 
married women are entitled to a survival pension (if they survive the spouse) or can access their 
husbands’ account balances, which are in many cases higher than the pension they can get 
  19through their own contributions, they have a smaller incentive to contribute relative to that of 
married men.
11  
Lastly, contribution rates vary with the area of residence. Urban residents have a higher 
probability of contributing than rural residents. Such differences could be explained by (i) 
differences in enforcement between rural and urban areas; (ii) higher earning opportunities 
during old-age in rural areas; or (iii) higher life expectation in urban areas. The exceptions are 
Costa Rica and Paraguay, where there are no significant differences by residence area. 
Interestingly, De la Rica and Lemieux (1993) examine the incidence of health insurance 
coverage in the United States and Spain and find patterns that are similar to the ones reported 
here. In both countries, coverage increases with education and experience. Coverage also 
increases for married individuals, particularly men. Such similarities suggest that the patterns of 
coverage of social security protection are similar across countries at different levels of 
development. Our results also confirm earlier results by Packard, Shinkai and Fuentes (2000) for 
Latin America; these authors attribute such patterns to a lack of access to social security for 
some groups of workers. 
 
Household Characteristics 
The structure of the household strongly affects the probability of participation in ways that are 
strikingly common across countries. Except in Paraguay and Nicaragua, male household heads 
are more likely to be contributing than other members of the household. In addition, individuals 
in households with a higher share of inactive members (relative to the total number of members 
in the household) have a higher probability of contributing (see Table 5). This probability 
increases with the age of the inactive individuals. In contrast, individuals in larger households 
are less likely to contribute.  
In addition, our findings strongly contradict the notion that individuals “free-ride” on 
other household members that are contributing to social security. We find that, in all countries, 
and therefore regardless of the pension model, the probability of participation increases between 
8 and 24 percentage points for workers who have at least one additional household member 
                                                       
11 Lower wages and shorter contribution periods result in low accrued rights, or lower account balances for women 
relative to the benefits they can get through their spouses’ contributions or accounts.  
  20contributing. This variable may be capturing unobserved household characteristics that are 
correlated with the probability of contributing.   
 
Job and Sector Characteristics 
 
Job characteristics are also important in determining contribution probabilities. Part-time 
workers are much less likely to be contributing to social security than workers employed full-
time. Similar results were also found by De la Rica and Lemieux (1993) for Spain and the United 
States. Workers in low-paid jobs are also less likely to be contributing than workers who earn 
higher wages. This is especially the case for workers who earn wages below the minimum wage.  
On the other hand, only in Costa Rica and Nicaragua is there evidence that workers in the 
bracket immediately above the MW are less likely to be contributing than workers in the control 
group (above MW*(1+t) and below MW*(1+t)
2), while the marginal effect of those in higher 
wage brackets does not significantly differ from the control group.  For the rest of the countries, 
the effects of the minimum wage on workers immediately above the minimum, if present, cannot 
be disentangled from other income effects.  
Our results also suggest that workers in larger firms are more likely to contribute than 
workers in small firms. Differences in enforcement among small and large firms, in training and 
development of specific skills, or in the existence of rents could explain this effect, whose 
magnitude is very large. Being employed in a firm of fewer than five employees reduces the 
probability of contribution from 16 percentage points in Paraguay to 53 percentage points in 
Mexico.  
Finally, contribution probabilities vary by sector. and the patterns are again common 
across countries.  In all, workers in the primary sector (Agriculture and Mining) have a lower 
probability of contributing than workers in the excluded sector (Manufacturing). This difference 
ranges from 5 percentage points lower in Argentina to 39 percent in El Salvador. Construction 
workers are also much less likely to be contributing than manufacturing workers (with an 
implied difference in participation between 9 and 34 percentage points). Workers in Transport, 
Storage and Communication and in Community, Social and Personal Services, are also less 
likely to be contributing than workers in Manufacturing. In contrast, contribution patterns are 
less clear for workers in Utilities and in Financing, Insurance, and Business Services. In some 
countries those workers exhibit higher contribution rates than in Manufacturing, while in other 
  21countries the opposite is true. Sector differences may arise from differences in technology and 
market structure that in turn lead to differences in rents across sectors. They may also reflect 
differences in enforcement rates across sectors.  Packard, Shinkai and Fuentes (2000) also find 
lower levels of coverage among workers in small firms and those employed in the agriculture, 
transportation and construction industries.  
To analyze the degree of commonality across countries in our study, we compute the 
cross-country correlations in marginal effects for all the variables of our model. Table A.2 
reports the results. The correlations’ coefficients are extremely high (above 0.70 in most cases) 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all cases.  This underscores the fact that the 
patterns of social security coverage are common in all countries of Latin America regardless of 
the pension system—a result that is unexpected in the light of a simple contribution model and 
the predictions of reform proponents.  
While it is expected that demand (individual and household characteristics) and supply 
(job, firm and sector characteristics) factors are highly correlated, it is useful to compute the 
upper and lower bounds of the fraction of the explained variance accounted for by demand 
factors. To compute these bounds, we first estimate Probit models for each country including 
only supply correlates. We compute the lower bound by comparing the resulting pseudo R-




2 Full. Similarly, we compute the upper 
bound by first estimating a Probit including only demand correlates and comparing this model’s 
pseudo R




2 Full). The results of these computations are presented in Table 6. 
We also perform the same computations with the R
2  obtained from estimating Linear Probability 
Models (LPM) instead of Probits. While the coefficients resulting from the LPM are very similar 
to the marginal effects in the Probit, the LPM has the advantage that the R
2 is directly related to 
the variance of the dependent variable, while the Pseudo R
2 is not.  
Both sets of computations yield similar results. In most cases, demand factors account for 
between one third and two-thirds of the total explained variance, suggesting that in addition to 
supply factors, demand variables play an important role in determining the probability of 
contributing to social security programs. An important exception is Mexico, where supply 





How much of the variance in social security contributions can be explained by individual and 
firm characteristics and how much can be explained by country policies or institutions, such as 
differences in enforcement or better management of social security schemes? To answer this 
question we take advantage of the high correlation between marginal effects across countries and 
run a cross-country estimation pooling all the individual data. We estimate the empirical model 
reported in Table 5, both with and without country dummies allowing for clustering of the errors 
at the country level. We then compare these results with the results of estimating a pooled model 
with only country dummies as explanatory variables. The first column of Table 7 reports the raw 
differences across countries, while the third column reports the results of adding all the controls. 
Adding individual, household and firm characteristics reduces the raw differences between the 
omitted country (Argentina) and the poorest countries (Nicaragua, Peru, Paraguay and El 
Salvador). Having a higher proportion of less educated, poorer and less advantaged workers, or 
having a high proportion of smaller firms, reduces affiliation rates in these countries. In El 
Salvador, for instance, these additional regressors can account for the whole mean difference in 
contribution rates with Argentina. On the other hand, Argentina’s and Mexico’s contribution rate 
looks comparatively lower than those found in Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela when supply and 
demand factors are accounted for.  
The marginal effects on the country dummies suggest that there are significant 
differences in contribution rates across countries even after accounting for individual, household 
and firm effects. Similar effects are obtained when individual observations are weighted so that 
all countries have equal weight. Differences in enforcement or in the overall attractiveness of 
social security systems may explain differences in country means.   
In contrast, country variables have a seemingly small effect on the explained variance. In 
addition to the pseudo R
2, a measure not directly related to the variance of the dependent variable 
and biased to be less than one, we include other measures of goodness of fit, such as the count of 
correctly classified observations, or the R
2 of a Linear Probability model. Neither the pseudo R
2, 
the R
2 nor the predictions of the model improve much when country dummies are taken into 
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to 80.34 (80.61) in the model without special weighs (with special weights), a fairly marginal 
improvement. Similarly, the R
2 increases from 0.34 (0.35) to 0.38 (0.42) when country effects are 
added to the model without weights (with weights). In sum, country factors such as institutional 
enforcement or the attractiveness of the social security program explain differences in mean 
contribution rates across countries, but explain little of the individual variance in contribution 
rates.  
The analysis above indicates that the patterns of contribution to social security exhibit 
prominent regularities across countries, individuals, households, firms and sectors. An analysis 
of variance suggests that in addition to supply factors, demand factors account for a substantial 
share of the explained variance.  In the next section, we compare the patterns of contributions 
between salaried and self-employment workers. Similar patterns across the two groups would 
confirm that to an important extent the patterns of contributions among salaried workers respond 
to the voluntary choices of workers rather than, or in addition to, the evasion decisions of firms.  
 
5.3. Results for Self-Employed Workers 
 
Table 8 presents Probit estimates of the probability of contributing to social security for self-
employed workers in Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica.
12 The results show patterns that are very 
similar to those found for salaried workers.  
The probability of contributing increases with age and education. It is also higher for 
married men than for married women, and for workers living in urban areas. Yet, unlike the case 
of salaried workers, there are no overall patterns in the rate of contribution of single women 
relative to single men. 
Household characteristics also have a similar effect on the probability of contribution of 
self-employed workers than for salaried workers. Contribution rates tend to be higher for 
household heads relative to other members of the household; the share of inactive members 
increases the probability of contributing, and that effect is larger for older dependents. Finally, as 
was the case for salaried workers, the probability of contributing is lower for individuals living 
in larger households.  
                                                       
12 The incidence of contributions among the self-employed in Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and El Salvador is 
too small to estimate the probability of contribution in these four countries. In Brazil, contributions among self-
  24Another strong regularity is that, like in the case of salaried workers, participation 
declines among the self-employed that work part-time, relative to full-time self-employed. There 
are also some regularities by sector of activity, but they do not coincide with those found for 
salaried workers. Thus, contribution rates are higher for workers in the Transport, Storage and 
Communications, Wholesale and Retail Trade, and Hospitality sectors than for workers in the 
Manufacturing sector. In most countries, self-employed workers in Community, Social and 
Personal Services also show higher contribution rates than self-employed workers in the 
Manufacturing sector. Instead, patterns in the Construction and Agriculture sector tend to be less 
clear-cut, with some countries showing higher participation in these sectors than in 
Manufacturing and others showing the reverse.  
Table 9 shows the coefficients resulting from correlating the vector of coefficients 
associated with demand variables (individual and household characteristics) for salaried workers 
with the same vector of coefficients for the self-employed in the three countries for which we 
can estimate contribution probabilities for these workers. Remarkably, the correlation 
coefficients are all above 0.75 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This confirms 
that, despite differences in the overall level of contributions, the patterns of contributions within 
these two groups of workers are very similar, suggesting that the patterns of contributions among 
salaried workers are to an important extent determined by individual and household preferences 
for social protection.  
Nonetheless, we have uncovered a few systematic differences in contribution patterns 
across the two groups, particularly among supply factors. Such differences may help reveal 
situations in which contribution rates among salaried workers are not the outcome of individual 
preferences but instead, the results of firms’ choices and/or government enforcement.  We focus 
on such differences by estimating a model of contributions pooling the two samples of workers 
and interacting all variable with a dummy that identifies if a worker is self-employed.   
Table 10 summarizes the results of such extended model, again focusing on the three 
countries for which enough self-employed workers are contributing to social security.  While 
some of the interactions between individual or household characteristics and self-employment 
are statistically significant, the only pattern that emerges is that the effect of having other 
members of the household affiliated with social security has a smaller effect on the contribution 
                                                                                                                                                                           
employed workers are voluntary.  
  25rates of self-employed workers than among salaried ones. We do not have a good explanation for 
this effect. 
Instead, systematic differences across the two groups arise in the effect of job 
characteristics, reinforcing the view that for some workers supply factors are an important 
determinant of contributions. Thus, earning wages below the minimum wage reduces the 
probability of contributions in both sectors, but the effect is more prominent in the wage 
employment sector, suggesting that firms that pay wages below the minimum wage are also 
likely to evade social security contributions (or force workers to register as self-employed).  
Similarly, part-time workers have a lower probability of contributing to social security, relative 
to full time workers, in the wage employment than in the self-employment sector. This suggests 
that, at least for some workers, part-time salaried work might be the result of a deliberate 
strategy by firms to evade social security. Lastly, it is also worth noting that the distribution of 
contributions across sectors tends to be skewed towards manufacturing among the salaried and 
against manufacturing among the self-employed.  This pattern appears to emerge from the 
stricter enforcement of social security laws in the manufacturing sector relative to other sectors 





Similar patterns of contributions of salaried and self-employed workers across individual and 
household characteristics suggest that demand factors are important in explaining contribution 
decisions. Therefore, low contribution rates are partly explained by the inability of enforcement 
authorities to undo the outcomes of voluntary choices.  Yet, there is also evidence that at least 
some workers are rationed out of social security. This is the case for workers employed in part-
time jobs or earning wages below the statutory minimum. It could also be the case for workers 
employed in small firms.   
These results seem to be at odds with traditional theories of labor market segmentation 
stating that workers are rationed out of good jobs with benefits. Yet, recent evidence for Latin 
                                                       
13 Notice that stricter enforcement in manufacturing explains both the higher coefficient in manufacturing wage 
employment and the lower coefficient in manufacturing self-employment. This is because higher enforcement in the 
manufacturing wage employment is likely to push some manufacturing workers towards the self-employment 
sector, which in turn reduces the contribution rate among manufacturing self-employed workers. This is so, because 
enforcement displaces workers with lower willingness to contribute.  
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reality.  Maloney (1999) and Bosh and Maloney (2005) study mobility patterns across sectors 
using detailed panel data for Mexico, Argentina and Brazil and find little evidence in favor of the 
dualistic model. Navarro-Lozano and Schrimpf (2004) estimate counterfactual wages for formal 
workers in the informal sector in Mexico and also conclude that there is no evidence of 
segmentation in the labor market. Gong, van Soest and Villagomez (2004) and Gong and van 
Soest (2002) estimate dynamic multinomial Logit models to assess mobility patterns in Mexico. 
Interestingly, they conclude “Many of our findings suggest that, for the lower educated workers, 
the dualistic view of the labor markets is not a good description.”  Yet, these authors also 
overturn traditional views by concluding that the market for higher educated workers seems to 
behave more according to the dual hypothesis.  The work presented in our study suggest that 
informal sector jobs may be desirable to lower educated workers because they allow them to 
evade contributions on programs they don’t want. Instead, since protection is more valuable for 
higher educated workers, formal jobs might be more desirable for those workers.  
Our results are also in line with a number of recent studies indicating that workers bear a 
part of the cost of social security contributions in the form of lower wages. Edwards and Cox-
Edwards (2002) find that in Chile, after controlling for selection, wages of individuals 
contributing to social security are 8.5 percent lower than those of non-contributors. Since 
contributions to social security (health, life insurance and pensions) amount to about 20 percent, 
more than 40 percent of the contributions are passed on to workers. Gruber (1997), MacIsaac 
and Rama (1997), Marrufo (2001), Mondino and Montoya (2004), and Heckman and Pagés 
(2004) also find evidence of sizeable pass-through in Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Argentina, and in 
a sample of Latin American countries, respectively. Workers not willing or able to accept a wage 
cut prefer not to contribute; weak enforcement allows them that option.   
 
  276. Conclusions 
  
This paper explores the reasons behind the low rates of contribution to mandatory social security 
systems in Latin America. Our results indicate that the low rates of contributions are partly 
explained by demand factors (such as individual preferences), and partly by the nature of the 
labor market in which contributors work.  Weak enforcement has enabled many workers to opt 
out of social security programs they do not find them beneficial, either because of 
workers’myopia or because social security systems are not well targeted to workers’ needs. 
Across countries, the pattern is strikingly similar: the unskilled, the young, married women, 
workers living in large households with many active members, workers without other members 
of the household contributing to social security, workers with low wages and workers in rural 
areas find social security programs less attractive than the average worker. Yet, not all non-
compliance decisions are the result of workers’ choices. The evidence presented in this paper 
also suggests that some workers are rationed out of social security. This seems to be the case for 
workers in part-time jobs and earnings below the minimum wage. It is also likely to be the case 
for at least some workers employed in small firms.   
Our findings raise some key implications for public policy. The first one is that 
toughening enforcement can increase the percentage of contributors to social security but reduce 
salaried employment for workers unwilling to contribute.
14 The second implication is that the 
benefits of minimum wage policies should be weighted against their potential adverse effects on 
social security contributions. A related implication is that part-time work should not be a safe 
haven for evasion; regulations pertaining to this form of work should be reviewed to eliminate 
incentives for evasion. Our results also suggest that policies that seek to de-link contributions 
from labor market participation will not necessarily solve the contribution deficit. Instead, if the 
problem lies in the fact that the current system is not attractive to a large number of less-
advantaged workers, policies intended to increase the coverage of social security programs 
should alter the current equation of benefits and contributions. This may imply finding 
alternative financing schemes, in which workers with high willingness to contribute cross-
subsidize workers with lower willingness to contribute.  It may also imply targeting the package 
of benefits to the needs and risks of people with low willingness to contribute. The latter is true 
                                                       
14 It may also reduce welfare, unless workers are time-inconsistent or rationally bounded in their inter-temporal 
  28even if the current design is the optimal one and workers do not contribute as a result of myopia 
or bounded rationality. Forcing people to save against their will becomes very difficult in 
countries with weak enforcement capabilities.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
consumption choices.  
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Table 1
Percentage of workers contributing to social security
(In percentages)
National sample: Males and females 15 to 64 years old working more than 5 hours a week
Early 90's





































 (4) 72.65 71.11 65.26 69.67 67.83 66.85 61.81 65.50
Brazil 57.14 56.29 53.65 55.69 69.53 69.83 73.28 70.88 75.46 73.63 72.89 74.00 17.39 15.90 16.90 16.73
Chile 
(5) 64.33 66.73 65.12 65.39 76.75 79.33 77.36 77.81 77.21 79.71 77.41 78.11 23.48 22.43 19.50 21.80
Colombia 36.26 35.63 35.94 52.27 54.49 53.38 45.33 47.30 46.32 8.55 7.45 8.00
Costa Rica 71.03 68.22 65.68 68.31 78.21 75.22 73.85 75.76 72.17 69.31 67.97 69.82 46.00 43.29 37.13 42.14
Mexico
 (4) 52.07 48.31 49.69 50.02 66.00 62.42 63.76 64.06 60.92 57.39 59.73 59.35 0.19 0.12 0.09 0.13
Nicaragua
 (5) 20.45 20.45 31.70 31.70 25.09 25.09 1.09 1.09
Peru 21.02 16.18 18.60 37.62 28.70 33.16 27.15 19.25 23.20 2.78 1.47 2.13
Paraguay 16.37 16.37 29.86 29.86 19.14 19.14 1.06 1.06
El Salvador 38.92 38.92 53.91 53.91 46.39 46.39 3.36 3.36
Venezuela 60.22 64.61 62.42 51.24 56.25 53.75
Notes:
(1) Early 90's: reports average of data available for each country in period 1990-1993.
(2) Middle 90's: reports average of data available for each country in period 1994-1997.
(3) Late 90's and early 00's: reports average of data available for each country in period 1998-2002.
(4) Urban areas. 
(5) Workers in the sector 9 (ISIC Rev.2) are considered employed in the public sector.
Source: Individual Country's Household Surveys. See Table A.1 for a description of the data.
Self-employed Workers
Country
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urity systems in Latin America
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica El Salvador Mexico Nicaragua Paraguay Peru
Dual Pay-as-you-go
Individual      
Capitalizacion      
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Parallel Dual
Individual     
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July 1994 - May 1981 April 1994 February 2000 April 1998 July 1997







Yes, for workers 
between 36 and 
55/50 years old




Yes, for workers 
entering the labor 
force in 1982
No Yes
Yes, for new 
entrants after 1998
Yes, for new 
entrants after July 
1997
--
(65 since 2001) 
nd 30 years of 
contributions
65 and 35 years of 
contributions for 
urban, 60/30 rural 
65 and 20 years of 
contributions
60 (rise to 62 in 
2009) 1000 weeks 
of contrib.
61 and 11 months 
with 466 monthly 
contrib. (reduced 
to 240 if age 65)
60 with 25 years of 
contrib. or just 30 
years contrib.
65 and 1,250 weeks 
of contributions
60 and 750 weeks 
of contributions
60 with 25 years or  
age 55 with 30 
years of 
contributions
65 (and 20 y
contributi
pay-as-y
(60 since 2001) 
nd 30 years of 
contributions
60 and 30 years of 
contributions for 
urban, 55/25 rural 
60 and 20 years of 
contributions
55 (rise to 58 in 
2009) 1000 weeks 
of contrib
59 and 11 months 
with 466 monthly 
contrib. (reduced 
to 240 if age 65)
55 with 25 years of 
contrib. or just 30 
years contrib.
65 and 1,250 weeks 
of contributions
60 and 750 weeks 
of contributions
60 with 25 years or  
age 55 with 30 
years of 
contributions




Allowed if pension 
equals at least 50% 
of average wage over 
last 10 years and is at 
least equal to 110% 




55 and 750 weeks 
of contributions
Early Retirement for 
ICA                
(2)
pension
Allowed if ICA is 
sufficient to 
purchase an 
annuity equal to 
110% of minimum 
wage.
-
Alowed if pension 
equals at least 60% 
of basic earnings or 








27 28.125 13 13.5 7.25 10.5 9.1 5.25 21 11
46 29.125 21 29.8 27 21 23.1 15 21 21
Mandatory Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Volunt
N o Y e sN oN o N oN oN o N o Y e s
U=2.5 MOPRE, 
+ 1% for every 
contrib. year 
ove 30 + PC= 




ery contrib. year 
after 1994 or 
70%, plus 6% after 
30 years of 
contributions
ICA
65%              
plus 2% for each 
50 weeks of 
contrib. between 
1,000-1,200 weeks, 
max. of 73%. Plus 
3% for each 50 
weeks 1,200-1,400, 
max. of 85%.
60%              
plus 0.0835% for 
each month of 
contribution 
above 240.
ICA                
or 30% of base 
salary plus 1.5% for 
each additional 
year.
ICA              
or 35%, plus 1.25% 
per year of 
contribution 
beyond 500 weeks
40%              
plus 1.365% for 
each 50 weeks of 
contrib.           
Or 45% + 1.591% if 
less than twice 
minimum wage
100%              
or 80% plus 4% for 
each year over age 








g. last 10 years
Avg, last 36 
months



















Are pension and 
other benefits 
bundled?
N o Y e s







              
               
              
r each 
 year of 
ons 
 20
9,000 bolivars a 
month (or fixed 
amount), plus 
30% of base 
salary
Base salary Av
Average of the 
highest 48 
monthly wage 
during last 5 years 
ofcoverage
Avg last 120 
months of earnings
Avg earnings 




during last 5, 4, or 
3 years (based on 
contrib. of 15, 20, 
or25years)
Avg earnings 





Avg earnings the 
highest five years 
in the last 10 
years.
         
                
y Contributions include pension for old-age, disability and death, work injury, sickness and maternity, family allowances, medical insurance and unemployment insurance. (2) ICA stands for Indi
 for "Modulo Previsional" in Spanish and it is an average pension retribution assigned by the government. PBU Spanish acronym for Basic Universal Pension (pay-as-you-go guaranteed basic
Public Pension for workers remaining in the public system. 
nd Social Security Administration (1999).
 











Not yet     
implemented
Is it Voluntary the 
new system ?
Y e s -
Is it Mandatory the 
new system?
N o -







60 and 750 weeks 
of contributions




Notes: (1) Social Securit vidual Capitalization 
Account. MOPRE stands  pension).  PAP Spanish 
acronym for Additional 
Source: Country Laws a  35
Table 3
Mean of the variables f
Variable Peru Venezuela
Contributing to social secur 0.2387 0.5480
Female 0.3025 0.2992






Less than primary complet 0.1052 0.1564
Primary complete 0.1167 0.2212
Secondary incomplete 0.1745 0.2833
Secondary complete 0.3387 0.1835
College incomplete 0.1655 0.1053
College complete 0.0994 0.0503
Household composition
H e a d  o f  t h e  h o u s e h o l 10 . 3 6 2 00 . 3 7 2 9
Other members contributi 0.2825 0.5760
Share of household memb 0.4549 0.4171
Share of household memb 0.2615 0.1539
Share of household memb 0.2358 0.2824
Share of household memb 0.0320 0.0258
T o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  m e m 76 . 0 4 2 65 . 6 7 0 4
Geographic area
Urban 0.8032 na
Income Intervals in relation
Wage < Minimum Wage  0.3836 0.4120
Min. Wage < Wage < Min 0.0373 0.1102
Min. Wa
or the sample of salaried workers
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica El Salvador Mexico  Nicaragua Paraguay
ity 0.6520 0.7396 0.7811 0.4631 0.6899 0.4639 0.5927 0.2536 0.1902
0.3165 0.3006 0.2388 0.3923 0.3015 0.3046 0.3372 0.1926 0.3446
0 . 5 8 0 70 . 2 7 0 40 . 6 2 9 30 . 5 2 7 50 . 5 0 6 40 . 4 8 5 20 . 5 5 1 30 . 5 5 8 70 . 5 6 3
0.2513 0.3252 0.2100 0.2582 0.3346 0.3275 0.3130 0.3910 0.3448
0.5948 0.6037 0.6701 0.6575 0.5794 0.5772 0.6028 0.5195 0.5725
0.1539 0.0711 0.1199 0.0844 0.0859 0.0953 0.0842 0.0895 0.0826
e 0.0700 0.1713 0.1263 0.1113 0.1940 0.3234 0.1094 0.4912 0.1971
0.2732 0.1537 0.0741 0.1544 0.3719 0.1153 0.1859 0.1470 0.2637
0.2188 0.3897 0.3190 0.2583 0.1980 0.2513 0.3439 0.2046 0.2879
0.1991 0.1891 0.2733 0.2888 0.1132 0.1870 0.1638 0.0781 0.1548
0.1339 0.0351 0.1519 0.0860 0.0946 0.0642 0.0606 0.0543 0.0664
0.1050 0.0610 0.0555 0.1012 0.0381 0.0587 0.1366 0.0249 0.0301
d 0 . 5 0 6 80 . 4 7 2 60 . 5 2 3 80 . 4 1 1 20 . 4 4 5 70 . 4 4 5 20 . 4 5 1 90 . 4 1 6 60 . 4 2 5
ng to social security 0.4669 0.7062 0.6710 0.4474 0.7502 0.4197 0.6891 0.2585 0.1775
ers with positive income 0.4978 0.5337 0.4572 0.4944 0.4400 0.4302 0.4748 0.4155 0.4935
ers less than 15 and out of the labor force 0.1995 0.2300 0.2015 0.2428 0.2602 0.2809 0.1905 0.3272 0.2953
ers 15 to 64 and out of the labor force 0.2684 0.2096 0.2131 0.2322 0.2688 0.2530 0.3105 0.2270 0.1838
ers older than 64 and out of the labor force 0.0327 0.0223 0.0244 0.0287 0.0272 0.0292 0.0227 0.0216 0.0202
b e r s  i n  t h e  h o u s e h o l d 4 . 1 7 4 54 . 4 6 1 94 . 6 3 9 14 . 8 0 2 44 . 8 8 6 15 . 0 8 7 44 . 6 8 3 86 . 2 9 0 95 . 2 1 8
na 0.9339 0.8411 0.9008 0.4769 0.6766 na 0.6233 0.7499
 to Minimum Wage
0.0296 0.0813 0.1671 0.3794 0.3765 0.3586 0.0996 0.1337 0.5848
. Wage (1+t)  0.0338 0.0465 0.0014 0.1517 0.1545 0.1159 0.0715 0.0310 0.0806
 Min. Wage (1+t)
2 0.0662 0.0607 0.0017 0.1016 0.1366 0.0900 0.0905 0.0524 0.0510
e < Min. Wage (1+t)
3 0.1187 0.0803 0.0024 0.0934 0.1034 0.0772 0.1055 0.0603 0.0606
e 0 . 7 5 1 70 . 7 3 1 30 . 8 2 7 40 . 2 7 3 90 . 2 2 9 00 . 3 5 8 30 . 6 3 2 80 . 7 2 2 60 . 2 2 2
0.1144 0.0468 0.0383 0.0820 0.0941 0.0990 0.0701 0.0974 0.1374
0.2965 0.1419 0.1807 na 0.3156 0.3421 0.2330 0.4000 0.4918
try, Fishing, Mining and Quarrying 0.0038 0.0094 0.2318 0.0620 0.2111 0.1810 0.0103 0.3635 0.0629
0.2910 0.3798 0.2354 0.2400 0.2187 0.2724 0.3000 0.2117 0.2100
a t e r 0 . 0 0 7 80 . 0 0 9 30 . 0 1 4 60 . 0 0 6 20 . 0 0 2 60 . 0 0 5 40 . 0 0 8 90 . 0 2 0 40 . 0 0 2
0.0574 0.1214 0.1157 0.0612 0.0731 0.1029 0.0574 0.1075 0.0930
e and Restaurants and Hotels 0.2230 0.2396 0.1999 0.2620 0.2219 0.2122 0.2210 0.2180 0.2315
n d  C o m m u n i c a t i o n 0 . 1 2 5 20 . 0 8 4 30 . 0 9 9 70 . 0 8 4 00 . 0 5 5 70 . 0 7 0 00 . 0 7 0 90 . 0 6 3 80 . 0 6 1
 Estate and Business Services 0.1239 0.0349 0.1030 0.0993 0.0492 0.0729 0.0299 0.0151 0.0749
rsonal Services 0.1678 0.1212 na 0.1855 0.1677 0.0832 0.3015 na 0.2639
25,846 229,892 165,218 71,534 46,234 46,552 972,734 4,578 4,732
 are mutually exclusive. na  denotes not-available. The data refers to workers in the private sector working more than 5 hours a week. The coverage of the sample is national, except in Argentina where data refers to Greater Buenos Aires and Mexico
aragua workers in Sector 9 (ISIC Rev.2) are considered to be employed in the public sector.
 
ge (1+t) < Wage < 0.0485 0.0570
Min. Wage (1+t)
2 < Wag 0.0343 0.0545
Min. Wage (1+t)
3 < Wag 90 . 4 9 6 20 . 3 6 6 3
Firm
Part time worker 0.1322 0.0541
Small firm (<5 workers) 0.4121 0.3064
Sector
Agriculture, Hunting, Fores 0.1817 0.1092
Manufacturing 0.2001 0.2041
E l e c t r i c i t y ,  G a s  a n d  W 20 . 0 0 6 60 . 0 0 8 9
Construction 0.0848 0.1069
Wholesale and Retail Trad 0.1943 0.2462
T r a n s p o r t ,  S t o r a g e  a 60 . 0 9 1 20 . 0 5 9 1
Financing, Insurance, Real 0.0682 0.0842
Community, Social and Pe 0.1730 0.1815
Number of observations 6,593 119,552
Notes: Education categories (**) .  t   denotes social security 
contribution rate. In Chile and Nic 
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Probit estimates of the probability of contributing to social security. Salaried workers. Marginal effects.
Variable Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica El Salvador Mexico Nicaragua Paraguay Peru Venezuela
Female 0.0514 0.0676 0.0074 0.0787 0.0984 0.1850 0.1065 0.0246 0.0038 -0.0282 0.0547
(0.0148)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0083) (0.0126)*** (0.0090)*** (0.0178)*** (0.0046)*** (0.0404) (0.0249) (0.0223) (0.0094)***
Married 0.0209 0.0530 0.0471 0.0332 0.1146 0.0507 0.0552 0.0122 0.0486 0.0567 0.0409
(0.0144) (0.0037)*** (0.0063)*** (0.0121)*** (0.0112)*** (0.0144)*** (0.0048)*** (0.0242) (0.0196)** (0.0166)*** (0.0073)***
Married * Female 0.0231 -0.0337 -0.0618 0.0247 -0.2887 -0.0480 -0.0658 0.0743 -0.0255 -0.0351 -0.0351
(0.0216) (0.0066)*** (0.0127)*** (0.0164) (0.0202)*** (0.0211)** (0.0072)*** (0.0537) (0.0266) (0.0222) (0.0117)***
Age
25-49 0.1164 0.0741 0.0710 0.1226 0.0914 0.0747 0.0616 0.0790 0.0347 0.0929 0.0819
(0.0133)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0064)*** (0.0099)*** (0.0085)*** (0.0130)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0226)*** (0.0174)** (0.0156)*** (0.0068)***
50-64 0.1070 0.0174 0.0584 0.1534 0.0555 0.1162 0.0485 0.2192 0.1787 0.1997 0.0735
(0.0157)*** (0.0055)*** (0.0068)*** (0.0158)*** (0.0126)*** (0.0236)*** (0.0066)*** (0.0597)*** (0.0482)*** (0.0382)*** (0.0113)***
25-49 * Female -0.0078 0.0020 0.0290 0.0057 0.0331 0.0134 0.0095 -0.0163 0.0543 0.0993 0.0630
(0.0213) (0.0055) (0.0098)*** (0.0153) (0.0139)** (0.0217) (0.0067) (0.0434) (0.0359) (0.0375)*** (0.0116)***
50-64 * Female 0.0167 0.0116 0.0277 -0.0387 0.0377 -0.0168 -0.0296 -0.1124 -0.0040 0.0342 0.0733
(0.0291) (0.0110) (0.0152)* (0.0287) (0.0248) (0.0446) (0.0120)** (0.0284)*** (0.0526) (0.0528) (0.0210)***
Education
Primary complete 0.0013 0.0420 0.0271 0.0797 0.0719 0.1324 0.0403 -0.0034 0.0411 0.0095 0.0310
(0.0144) (0.0032)*** (0.0061)*** (0.0121)*** (0.0068)*** (0.0154)*** (0.0044)*** (0.0220) (0.0234)* (0.0231) (0.0076)***
Secondary incomplete -0.0096 0.0538 0.0435 0.1250 0.0833 0.1546 0.0744 0.0407 0.0759 0.0416 0.0607
(0.0154) (0.0029)*** (0.0051)*** (0.0113)*** (0.0079)*** (0.0123)*** (0.0042)*** (0.0237)* (0.0259)*** (0.0243)* (0.0076)***
Secondary complete 0.0682 0.1030 0.0949 0.2515 0.1362 0.2717 0.1205 0.0843 0.1463 0.0680 0.1176
(0.0152)*** (0.0031)*** (0.0053)*** (0.0110)*** (0.0086)*** (0.0150)*** (0.0046)*** (0.0355)** (0.0357)*** (0.0221)*** (0.0081)***
College incomplete 0.0583 0.0866 0.0997 0.3078 0.1219 0.3049 0.0997 0.2614 0.1548 0.0888 0.1309
(0.0170)*** (0.0054)*** (0.0054)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0244)*** (0.0064)*** (0.0603)*** (0.0490)*** (0.0278)*** (0.0095)***
College complete 0.0570 0.1210 0.0971 0.3459 0.1034 0.3098 0.0690 0.2065 0.1636 0.1712 0.1176
(0.0184)*** (0.0042)*** (0.0077)*** (0.0124)*** (0.0165)*** (0.0321)*** (0.0051)*** (0.0707)*** (0.0607)*** (0.0356)*** (0.0136)***
Household composition
Head of the household 0.0908 0.0621 0.0757 0.0975 0.1018 0.0650 0.0389 0.0074 0.0172 0.0591 0.1121
(0.0152)*** (0.0038)*** (0.0063)*** (0.0123)*** (0.0119)*** (0.0155)*** (0.0052)*** (0.0249) (0.0219) (0.0190)*** (0.0078)***
Head of the household * Female -0.0721 -0.0243 -0.0685 -0.0114 -0.0914 -0.0646 -0.0417 0.0656 0.0040 -0.0117 -0.0698
(0.0257)*** (0.0076)*** (0.0161)*** (0.0176) (0.0207)*** (0.0226)*** (0.0082)*** (0.0576) (0.0346) (0.0320) (0.0135)***
Other members contributing to social security 0.0858 0.0875 0.1005 0.2422 0.0818 0.1219 0.1173 0.1391 0.0910 0.0971 0.1492
(0.0067)*** (0.0016)*** (0.0028)*** (0.0052)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0082)*** (0.0017)*** (0.0142)*** (0.0124)*** (0.0081)*** (0.0035)***
Share of household members less than 15 and out of the labor force 0.1267 0.1140 0.1284 0.2467 0.1068 0.0780 0.1662 0.1355 0.0933 0.1118 0.0730
(0.0281)*** (0.0071)*** (0.0139)*** (0.0204)*** (0.0193)*** (0.0286)*** (0.0090)*** (0.0487)*** (0.0358)*** (0.0337)*** (0.0188)***
Share of household members 15 to 64 and out of the labor force 0.2109 0.1941 0.1889 0.3485 0.1798 0.1032 0.1566 0.2150 0.1357 0.2123 0.1388
(0.0243)*** (0.0067)*** (0.0134)*** (0.0185)*** (0.0185)*** (0.0287)*** (0.0076)*** (0.0522)*** (0.0356)*** (0.0315)*** (0.0130)***
Share of household members older than 64 and out of the labor force 0.2773 0.2229 0.2111 0.3629 0.3513 0.1590 0.2433 0.2027 0.2284 0.2470 0.1810
(0.0397)*** (0.0139)*** (0.0233)*** (0.0357)*** (0.0347)*** (0.0614)*** (0.0169)*** (0.1222)* (0.0698)*** (0.0548)*** (0.0299)***
Total number of members in the household -0.0230 -0.0220 -0.0214 -0.0363 -0.0213 -0.0139 -0.0281 -0.0133 -0.0137 -0.0109 -0.0203
(0.0029)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0017)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0026)*** (0.0010)***
Geographic area
Urban 0.0304 0.0254 0.1435 -0.0192 0.0203 0.0467 0.0148 0.0536
(0.0042)*** (0.0045)*** (0.0131)*** (0.0063)*** (0.0094)** (0.0168)*** (0.0144) (0.0128)***
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Probit estimates of the probability of contributing to social security. Salaried workers. Marginal effects.
Variable Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica El Salvador Mexico Nicaragua Paraguay Peru Venezuela
Income Intervals in relation to Minimum Wage
Wage < Minimum Wage  -0.3218 -0.1907 -0.0980 -0.1091 -0.1908 -0.1516 -0.1158 -0.0826 -0.1058 -0.0425 -0.0794
(0.0316)*** (0.0063)*** (0.0425)** (0.0099)*** (0.0093)*** (0.0140)*** (0.0060)*** (0.0280)*** (0.0242)*** (0.0247)* (0.0094)***
Min. Wage < Wage < Min. Wage (1+t)  -0.1491 -0.0595 0.0288 -0.0106 -0.0340 -0.0035 -0.0343 -0.0732 -0.0302 -0.0025 0.0514
(0.0261)*** (0.0062)*** (0.0492) (0.0112) (0.0107)*** (0.0172) (0.0064)*** (0.0340)** (0.0214) (0.0339) (0.0111)***
Min. Wage (1+t)
2 < Wage < Min. Wage (1+t)
3 0.0641 0.0402 -0.0068 0.0375 0.0158 -0.0206 0.0403 -0.0524 -0.0321 0.0105 0.0312
(0.0156)*** (0.0044)*** (0.0448) (0.0128)*** (0.0118) (0.0202) (0.0055)*** (0.0350) (0.0226) (0.0373) (0.0129)**
Min. Wage (1+t)
3 < Wage 0.1790 0.1586 0.0516 0.0775 0.0171 0.1137 0.0938 0.0472 -0.0102 0.0937 0.1072
(0.0154)*** (0.0046)*** (0.0389) (0.0113)*** (0.0106) (0.0172)*** (0.0048)*** (0.0310) (0.0218) (0.0253)*** (0.0096)***
Firm
Part time worker -0.3634 -0.4003 -0.3573 -0.3550 -0.3859 -0.2693 -0.3944 -0.1007 -0.0849 -0.1057 -0.3533
(0.0124)*** (0.0062)*** (0.0138)*** (0.0084)*** (0.0112)*** (0.0097)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0176)*** (0.0108)*** (0.0099)*** (0.0085)***
Small firm (<5 workers) -0.3515 -0.3593 -0.1986 -0.3042 -0.4514 -0.5333 -0.2474 -0.1605 -0.1924 -0.3986
(0.0081)*** (0.0039)*** (0.0060)*** (0.0064)*** (0.0066)*** (0.0023)*** (0.0141)*** (0.0140)*** (0.0093)*** (0.0046)***
Sector 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Quarrying -0.0570 -0.1404 -0.0734 -0.1257 -0.0660 -0.3942 -0.3803 -0.1792 -0.0686 -0.0694 -0.2546
(0.0524) (0.0116)*** (0.0063)*** (0.0150)*** (0.0093)*** (0.0063)*** (0.0083)*** (0.0177)*** (0.0149)*** (0.0132)*** (0.0088)***
Electricity, Gas and Water 0.1451 0.1044 -0.0090 0.0546 0.0365 0.0020 0.0749 0.2196 -0.0641 0.0377 0.0663
(0.0397)*** (0.0094)*** (0.0185) (0.0354) (0.0568) (0.0417) (0.0141)*** (0.0679)*** (0.0309)** (0.0584) (0.0285)**
Construction -0.2933 -0.2005 -0.0851 -0.2581 -0.3405 -0.2023 -0.2545 -0.1320 -0.1070 -0.0911 -0.2446
(0.0176)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0082)*** (0.0109)*** (0.0140)*** (0.0096)*** (0.0047)*** (0.0140)*** (0.0093)*** (0.0106)*** (0.0079)***
Wholesale and Retail Trade and Restaurants and Hotels -0.0291 -0.0345 -0.0047 -0.1076 -0.0458 -0.1082 -0.0781 -0.0632 -0.0341 -0.0295 -0.0518
(0.0103)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0063) (0.0078)*** (0.0094)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0172)*** (0.0149)** (0.0131)** (0.0069)***
Transport, Storage and Communication -0.1084 -0.0286 -0.0806 -0.1503 -0.1576 -0.2317 -0.1906 -0.0790 -0.0703 -0.0691 -0.2075
(0.0126)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0088)*** (0.0106)*** (0.0167)*** (0.0098)*** (0.0049)*** (0.0225)*** (0.0120)*** (0.0123)*** (0.0097)***
Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services 0.0574 -0.0173 0.0124 0.0776 -0.0846 0.0399 -0.3826 0.1790 -0.0521 -0.0153 0.0460
(0.0125)*** (0.0074)** (0.0088) (0.0116)*** (0.0184)*** (0.0220)* (0.0059)*** (0.0865)** (0.0140)*** (0.0174) (0.0102)***
Community, Social and Personal Services 0.0888 -0.0039 -0.1240 -0.1528 -0.1602 -0.2837 -0.0466 -0.0349 -0.1552
(0.0116)*** (0.0041) (0.0087)*** (0.0114)*** (0.0134)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0166)*** (0.0139)** (0.0076)***
Number of observations 22,232 227,739 115,749 68,782 41,383 34,850 898,504 4,552 4,699 6,568 106,032
Log likelihood -10712.77 -97119.39 -46275.87 -36549.28 -17822.36 -12332.2 -423435.88 -1589.31 -1616.88 -2371.96 -51441.49
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.26 0.21 0.23 0.31 0.48 0.31 0.38 0.29 0.34 0.29
Notes: The sample covers private sector employees working more than 5 hours a week. See table A.1 for a description of the years included in the estimation for each country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant 
at 5%, ***significant at 1%. The specification includes year dummies in all countries. Min. Wage     and      t   denote minimum wage and social security contributions, respectively  The omitted categories are the workers 15 to 24 years old, less 
than primary complete, manufacturing, the share of household members with positive income and the group where the Min. Wage (1+t) < Wage < Min. Wage (1+t)2. The coverage of the sample is national, except in Argentina where data refers to 
Greater Buenos Aires and Mexico.
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Argentina 0.27 0.46 0.23 0.49
Brazil 0.43 0.64 0.38 0.66
Chile 0.48 0.68 0.44 0.69
Colombia 0.69 0.82 0.66 0.84
Costa Rica 0.32 0.50 0.27 0.53
El Salvador 0.21 0.52 0.17 0.60
Mexico 0.15 0.28 0.11 0.31
Nicaragua 0.31 0.61 0.30 0.68
Paraguay 0.40 0.66 0.41 0.72
Peru 0.44 0.74 0.43 0.79
Venezuela 0.26 0.57 0.22 0.60
Demand Factors Demand Factors
Linear Probability Model  Probit Estimation
Table 6: Fraction of explained variance accounted by demand factors                              
                (individual and household characteristics)
Notes: The data refers to salaried workers in the private sector working more than 5 hours a week. The
coverage of the sample is national,except in Argentina where data refers to GeaterBuenos Aires and Mexico.
The upper and lower bounds of the fraction of the explained variance are computed as follows: We first
estimate a Probit model(ora linearprobability model,LPM) only with the supply correlates included in the the
specification presented in Table 5. We then compare the Pseudo-R square (or R-square) of this model, with that 
of the full model (as presented in Table 5) according to the formula (Pseudo R2 Full - Pseudo R2 Supply)/
Pseudo R2-Full. This number constitutes the lower bound of the fraction explained by demand factores. We
compute the upper bound by first estimating a Probit (or LPM) including only demand correlates and
comparing this model's Pseudo R2 with the one obtained from the full model, according to the formula: 1-
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Pooled estimates for 11 countries. Probability of contributing to social security for salaried workers
Probit - Marginal effects
Country dummies No country weights
Only with country 


















Brazil 0.1056 0.1080 0.1346 0.0754 0.0918
(0.0000)*** (0.0192)*** (0.0114)*** (0.0150)*** (0.0083)***
Chile 0.1521 0.2164 0.2691 0.1635 0.1732
(0.0000)*** (0.0133)*** (0.0255)*** (0.0151)*** (0.0142)***
Colombia 0.0456 0.2265 0.2727 0.1751 0.1664
(0.0000)*** (0.0134)*** (0.0284)*** (0.0210)*** (0.0181)***
Mexico -0.0206 -0.1057 -0.1046 -0.0746 -0.0680
(0.0000)*** (0.0073)*** (0.0054)*** (0.0052)*** (0.0040)***
Nicaragua -0.3510 -0.2688 -0.2184 -0.2124 -0.1886
(0.0000)*** (0.0173)*** (0.0227)*** (0.0155)*** (0.0244)***
Peru -0.4339 -0.3290 -0.3154 -0.2153 -0.2407
(0.0000)*** (0.0116)*** (0.0096)*** (0.0170)*** (0.0151)***
Paraguay -0.4395 -0.2955 -0.2806 -0.1804 -0.2041
(0.0000)*** (0.0172)*** (0.0081)*** (0.0190)*** (0.0146)***
El Salvador -0.1643 -0.0300 -0.0244 -0.0385 -0.0409
(0.0000)*** (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0159)** (0.0160)**
Venezuela -0.0159 0.1806 0.1911 0.1355 0.1146
(0.0000)*** (0.0172)*** (0.0164)*** (0.0188)*** (0.0113)***
Number of observations 251,283 222,267 222,267 222,267 222,267 222,267 222,267 222,267 222,267
Log likelihood -155,749.31 -106,214.30 -99,550.30 -107,176.72 -95,219.72 -109,387.06 -102,546.78 -112,894.94 -100,346.13
Pseudo R2  0.08 0.28 0.33 0.30 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.35 0.42
Count R2 (Correctly Classified) 66.94 78.65 80.34 77.24 80.61
No country weights All countries equal weight
Probit - Marginal effects Linear regression model
No country weights All countries equal weight
Notes: The sample covers private sector employees working more than 5 hours a week. The estimation is for the year 2000, in those cases where there was no data available for that year, we consider the closest year available. In addition to reported 
variables, all specifications include the explanatory variables shown in Table 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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Probit estimates of the probability of contributing to social security for the sample of self-employed workers. Marginal effects.
Variable Chile Colombia Costa Rica
Female -0.0338 0.0101 0.0024
(0.0371) (0.0109) (0.0472)
Married 0.0482 0.0139 0.1783
(0.0128)*** (0.0046)*** (0.0180)***
Married * Female -0.0873 0.0004 -0.3843
(0.0180)*** (0.0070) (0.0175)***
Age
25-49 0.0424 0.0211 0.1091
(0.0182)** (0.0061)*** (0.0209)***
50-64 0.0887 0.055 0.1374
(0.0234)*** (0.0116)*** (0.0264)***
25-49 * Female 0.1138 0.0188 0.0928
(0.0484)** (0.0123) (0.0554)*
50-64 * Female 0.1765 0.0049 0.0169
(0.0587)*** (0.0129) (0.0600)
Education
Primary complete 0.0163 0.0306 0.1164
(0.0133) (0.0058)*** (0.0128)***
Secondary incomplete 0.0398 0.033 0.0995
(0.0111)*** (0.0055)*** (0.0173)***
Secondary complete 0.1298 0.0611 0.1684
(0.0143)*** (0.0073)*** (0.0220)***
College incomplete 0.1567 0.1034 0.1383
(0.0191)*** (0.0149)*** (0.0260)***
College complete 0.3035 0.1781 0.1206
(0.0297)*** (0.0172)*** (0.0379)***
Household composition
Head of the household 0.0493 0.0201 0.0858
(0.0142)*** (0.0051)*** (0.0212)***
Head of the household * Female -0.0656 -0.0022 -0.0789
(0.0199)*** (0.0070) (0.0356)**
Other members contributing to social security 0.1067 0.0502 0.0357
(0.0062)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0086)***
Share of household members less than 15 and out of the labor force 0.1385 0.0411 0.1362
(0.0264)*** (0.0086)*** (0.0358)***
Share of household members 15 to 64 and out of the labor force 0.2144 0.0687 0.2888
(0.0237)*** (0.0078)*** (0.0328)***
Share of household members older than 64 and out of the labor force 0.3591 0.1075 0.3561
(0.0382)*** (0.0140)*** (0.0605)***
Total number of members in the household -0.0281 -0.0108 -0.0218
(0.0030)*** (0.0009)*** (0.0035)***
Geographic area
Urban 0.0338 0.0161 -0.0469
(0.0096)*** (0.0038)*** (0.0114)***
Income Intervals in relation to Minimum Wage
Wage < Minimum Wage  -0.074 -0.0116 -0.052
(0.0514) (0.0045)** (0.0181)***
Min. Wage < Wage < Min. Wage (1+t)  0.0108 -0.0073 0.0014
(0.1285) (0.0051) (0.0235)
Min. Wage (1+t)
2 < Wage < Min. Wage (1+t)
3 -0.0799 0.0144 0.0602
(0.0525) (0.0071)** (0.0247)**
Min. Wage (1+t)
3 < Wage 0.0127 0.02 0.0492
(0.0603) (0.0055)*** (0.0195)**
Firm
Part time worker -0.0771 -0.026 -0.1039
(0.0085)*** (0.0028)*** (0.0125)***
Sector
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Quarrying -0.019 0.0148 0.0993
(0.0146) (0.0096) (0.0190)***
Construction 0.0348 0.0002 -0.1135
(0.0164)** (0.0064) (0.0190)***
Wholesale and Retail Trade and Restaurants and Hotels 0.0215 0.0122 -0.0079
(0.0125)* (0.0047)*** (0.0177)
Transport, Storage and Communication 0.0321 0.0507 0.0735
(0.0162)** (0.0088)*** (0.0238)***
Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services 0.1215 0.0439 0.0087
(0.0308)*** (0.0108)*** (0.0325)
Community, Social and Personal Services 0.0251 0.0392 -0.0478
(0.0146)* (0.0061)*** (0.0186)***
Number of observations 34,229 51,032 13,638
Log likelihood -16182.2 -11498.71 -7416.76
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.19 0.19
Notes: The sample covers self-employed working more than 5 hours a week. See table A.1 for a description of the years included in the estimation for 
each country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. The specification includes year 
dummies in all countries. Min. Wage and t denote minimum wage and social security contributions, respectively. The omitted categories are the workers 
15 to 24 years old, less than primary complete, manufacturing, the share of household members with positive income and the group where the Min. Wage 
(1+t) < Wage < Min. Wage (1+t)2. The coverage of the sample is national.
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Table 9
Correlation coefficients between salaried workers and self-employed marginal effects








Notes: The coefficients are computed correlating the vectors of estimated marginal effects for individual and household 
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Probit estimates of the probability of contributing to social security. Full sample. Marginal effects. 
Variable
Var Var * Self Var Var * Self Var Var * Self
Self Employed -0.4046 -0.3925 -0.3556
(0.1022)*** (0.0290)*** (0.0397)***
Female 0.0103 -0.0555 0.0608 -0.0307 0.1135 -0.1198
(0.0116) (0.0531) (0.0100)*** (0.0316) (0.0105)*** (0.0514)**
Married 0.0648 -0.0018 0.0252 0.0196 0.1312 0.0543
(0.0086)*** (0.0190) (0.0092)*** (0.0182) (0.0128)*** (0.0228)**
Married * Female -0.0823 -0.0421 0.0194 -0.0192 -0.3038 -0.2418
(0.0162)*** (0.0333) (0.0129) (0.0237) (0.0197)*** (0.0456)***
Age
25-49 0.0965 -0.0421 0.0906 -0.0276 0.1038 0.0081
(0.0084)*** (0.0259) (0.0071)*** (0.0224) (0.0096)*** (0.0238)
50-64 0.0851 0.0131 0.1299 0.0132 0.0647 0.0638
(0.0104)*** (0.0279) (0.0147)*** (0.0276) (0.0150)*** (0.0276)**
25-49 * Female 0.041 0.0808 0.0043 0.057 0.0381 0.0515
(0.0141)*** (0.0450)* (0.0117) (0.0382) (0.0161)** (0.0521)
50-64 * Female 0.0394 0.125 -0.0285 0.0521 0.0437 -0.0273
(0.0221)* (0.0433)*** (0.0206) (0.0477) (0.0291) (0.0678)
Education
Primary complete 0.0385 -0.0201 0.0637 0.0212 0.0829 0.0279
(0.0089)*** (0.0190) (0.0101)*** (0.0174) (0.0078)*** (0.0145)*
Secondary incomplete 0.0616 -0.0152 0.1006 -0.0063 0.0974 -0.0069
(0.0073)*** (0.0156) (0.0096)*** (0.0159) (0.0093)*** (0.0194)
Secondary complete 0.1357 0.0011 0.2152 -0.0486 0.1627 -0.0211
(0.0077)*** (0.0173) (0.0105)*** (0.0149)*** (0.0106)*** (0.0250)
College incomplete 0.1468 0.002 0.2989 -0.0509 0.1447 -0.0263
(0.0084)*** (0.0212) (0.0152)*** (0.0202)** (0.0128)*** (0.0296)
College complete 0.1468 0.1086 0.3427 0.0027 0.1257 -0.0274
(0.0128)*** (0.0244)*** (0.0158)*** (0.0224) (0.0203)*** (0.0441)
Household composition
Head of the household 0.1047 -0.0432 0.0747 -0.0112 0.1165 -0.0286
(0.0087)*** (0.0210)** (0.0095)*** (0.0183) (0.0137)*** (0.0264)
Head of the household * Female -0.0903 -0.0049 -0.0084 -0.0008 -0.0999 0.011
(0.0203)*** (0.0361) (0.0132) (0.0260) (0.0222)*** (0.0435)
Other members contributing to social security 0.1396 -0.0076 0.1844 -0.0285 0.0929 -0.0567
(0.0039)*** (0.0086) (0.0041)*** (0.0075)*** (0.0045)*** (0.0097)***
Share of household members less than 15 and out of the labor force 0.1784 -0.0075 0.1881 -0.0618 0.1203 0.0158
(0.0192)*** (0.0379) (0.0156)*** (0.0309)** (0.0219)*** (0.0418)
Share of household members 15 to 64 and out of the labor force 0.2624 0.0026 0.2657 -0.0544 0.2036 0.0849
(0.0186)*** (0.0348) (0.0142)*** (0.0283)* (0.0210)*** (0.0388)**
Share of household members older than 64 and out of the labor force 0.2933 0.1496 0.2765 0.0544 0.3974 -0.04
(0.0323)*** (0.0575)*** (0.0272)*** (0.0512) (0.0395)*** (0.0719)
Total number of members in the household -0.0297 -0.005 -0.0276 -0.0058 -0.0243 0.0028
(0.0016)*** (0.0040) (0.0014)*** (0.0031)* (0.0020)*** (0.0040)
Geographic area
Urban 0.0347 0.0088 0.1001 -0.0565 -0.0203 -0.0311
(0.0060)*** (0.0138) (0.0084)*** (0.0174)*** (0.0072)*** (0.0138)**
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Probit estimates of the probability of contributing to social security. Full sample. Marginal effects. 
Variable
Var Var * Self Var Var * Self Var Var * Self
Income Intervals in relation to Minimum Wage
Wage < Minimum Wage  -0.1301 0.0174 -0.0823 0.0492 -0.2122 0.145
(0.0531)** (0.0883) (0.0074)*** (0.0168)*** (0.0100)*** (0.0170)***
Min. Wage < Wage < Min. Wage (1+t)  0.0412 -0.0327 -0.0079 -0.0125 -0.0386 0.0416
(0.0720) (0.1812) (0.0084) (0.0189) (0.0120)*** (0.0247)*
Min. Wage (1+t)
2 < Wage < Min. Wage (1+t)
3 -0.0094 -0.1234 0.029 0.0154 0.0172 0.0422
(0.0615) (0.1255) (0.0103)*** (0.0212) (0.0136) (0.0260)
Min. Wage (1+t)
3 < Wage 0.0689 -0.059 0.0603 0.001 0.019 0.0316
(0.0510) (0.0951) (0.0092)*** (0.0168) (0.0122) (0.0219)
Firm
Part time worker -0.3986 0.1952 -0.2219 0.2606 -0.3953 0.2256
(0.0128)*** (0.0093)*** (0.0047)*** (0.0204)*** (0.0105)*** (0.0108)***
Small firm (<5 workers) -0.2367 -0.318
(0.0063)*** (0.0062)***
Sector
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Quarrying -0.0987 0.0657 -0.0873 0.158 -0.0736 0.1515
(0.0083)*** (0.0177)*** (0.0094)*** (0.0339)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0162)***
Electricity, Gas and Water -0.0138 0.0357 0.0627
(0.0246) (0.0266) (0.0654)
Construction -0.1121 0.1277 -0.164 0.2561 -0.35 0.1826
(0.0103)*** (0.0150)*** (0.0058)*** (0.0290)*** (0.0132)*** (0.0175)***
Wholesale and Retail Trade and Restaurants and Hotels -0.0065 0.0319 -0.0794 0.131 -0.051 0.0409
(0.0087) (0.0164)* (0.0056)*** (0.0174)*** (0.0105)*** (0.0195)**
Transport, Storage and Communication -0.1065 0.1208 -0.1031 0.2836 -0.1698 0.1928
(0.0111)*** (0.0156)*** (0.0066)*** (0.0243)*** (0.0172)*** (0.0182)***
Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services 0.0174 0.1015 0.0625 0.048 -0.0923 0.0912
(0.0125) (0.0254)*** (0.0099)*** (0.0247)* (0.0198)*** (0.0324)***
Community, Social and Personal Services -0.0892 0.2322 -0.1668 0.1033
(0.0059)*** (0.0197)*** (0.0121)*** (0.0192)***
Number of observations 150,024 119,915 55,023
Log likelihood -62457.23 -48370.46 -25212.61
Pseudo R2 0.35 0.35 0.31
Chile Colombia Costa Rica
Notes: For each country the specification includes the variables presented in Tables 5 and 8, plus a set of interactions of these variables with a dummy 
self-employed .  The sample covers private sector employees and self-employed working more than 5 hours a week. See table A.1 for a description of 
the years included in the estimation for each country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 
1%. The specification includes year dummies in all countries. Min. Wage and  t  denote minimum wage and social security contributions, respectively. 
The omitted categories are workers 15 to 24 years old, less than primary complete, manufacturing, the share of household members actively participating 
in the  labor market and the group where the Min. Wage (1+t) < Wage < Min. Wage (1+t)2. The coverage of the sample is national.
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Table A.1. Household survey description.
Country Years included Month of the survey Name of the survey Coverage
Average Number of 
Observations
Argentina 1990-2002 October Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Greater Buenos Aires
10,909
Brazil 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996 -1999 September Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios National
336,073
Chile 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 November Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional National
161,529
Colombia 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 September Encuesta Nacional de Hogares National
142,852
Costa Rica 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001 July Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National
40,981
El Salvador 1997-2002 January to December Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National
61,032
Mexico 1990-2001 January to December Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano Urban
343,296
Nicaragua 1998, 2001 April to August 98;  April to September 99 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares de Medición de Calidad de Vida National
57,920
Paraguay 1998, 1999 August 97 to July 98; August to December 99 Encuesta Integrada de Hogares National
22,429
Peru 1994, 1997, 2000 May to August 94; September to November 97; May to June 00 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Mediciones de Niveles de Vida National
19,398














  45  Table A.2
Correlation coefficients between estimated marginal effects across countries











0.7792* 0.8641* 0.8905* 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 `
0.8120* 0.8751* 0.9006* 0.8400* 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.6881* 0.8100* 0.7779* 0.8645* 0.7771* 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.7173* 0.8581* 0.8169* 0.7947* 0.8311* 0.8396* 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.7514* 0.7371* 0.6744* 0.8230* 0.6188* 0.7826* 0.6551* 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.6930* 0.7380* 0.7940* 0.8655* 0.8186* 0.8168* 0.7689* 0.7500* 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.7927* 0.8202* 0.8539* 0.8625* 0.8319* 0.7694* 0.8099* 0.7875* 0.9025* 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.8071* 0.8963* 0.8944* 0.8826* 0.8610* 0.9066* 0.8826* 0.7521* 0.7592* 0.8404* 1.0000













Notes: Sample of private sector employees working more than 5 hours a week;  The coefficients are computed correlating the vectors of estimated marginal effects 
presented in Table 5; * Significant at 1%, second line is the p-value.
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Table B1. Construction of the Social Security Variable from the Household Surveys’ Questionnaires 
 
Note: (1) In some of the surveys the original word in Spanish was “afiliado.” However, we assume that the person considers herself “afiliado” when she is 
contributing to the system. 
 
Construction of the social security variable from the household 
surveys' questionnaires 
  
      
      
Country  Survey question  Coverage  Social security variable 
Argentina  In this occupation are you entitled to: Answer: 1) Dismissal compensation; 2) 
Vacations; 3) 13th salary; 4) Pension; 5) Work insurance; 6) Others.  Dependent workers Takes value of 1 if answer is Pension 
Brazil  Do you contribute in this job to the Instituto de Previdencia? Answer: Yes/No.  All workers  Takes value of 1 if the answer is Yes 
Chile 
Are you contributing to a pension system? Answer: 1) SSS; 2) CANAEMPU; 3) 
EMPART; 4) INP; 5) AFP; 6) CAPEDRENA or DIPRECA; 7) Other; 8) Not 
contributing. 
All workers  Takes value of 1 if the answer is SSS, CANAEMPU, EMPART, INP, AFP, 
CAPEDRENA or DIPRECA or other 
Colombia  In your job, are you contributing 
(1) to any social pension institute? Answer: Yes/No.  All workers  Takes value of 1 if the answer is Yes 
Costa Rica 
What type of Social Insurance do you have? Directly Insured: 1) Salaried; 2) By 
agreement (associations, union, cooperatives, etc.); 3) Own account (voluntary); 4) By 
the State or family subsidy; 5) Relative of direct insured.  Pensioner: 6) 7) 8) 9); 10) 
All individuals 
from the survey  Takes value of 1 if the answer is salaried, by agreement or own account 
Mexico 
In your last week main job, which benefits do you receive? Answer: 1) 13th salary; 2) 
Vacations; 3) Share in the Benefits; 4) IMSS; 5) ISSSTE; 6) SAR; 7) Housing loan; 8) 
Medical insurance; 9) Others. 
All workers  Takes value of 1 if the answer is IMSS or ISSSTE 
Nicaragua  Do you contribute through this job to the Social Insurance (INSS)? Answer: Yes/No.   All workers  Takes value of 1 if the answer is Yes 
Paraguay  Are you contributing
 (1)  to any pension system? Answer: Yes/No.   All workers  Takes value of 1 if the answer is Yes 
Peru  Are you contributing 
(1) to any pension system? Answer: 1)ONP; 2) AFP; 3) Police; 4) 
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